



American Model United Nations
General Assembly First Committee

GA First/I/1

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

SUBMITTED TO: The General Assembly First Committee

The General Assembly First Committee,

1 *Aware* of the necessity to establish cohesive standards for the maintenance of treaties regarding the devel-
2 opment and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on a global scale,

3 *Taking into account* the widespread desire to improve Member State compliance with the Biological Weapons
4 Convention (BWC) and its Implementation Support Unit (ISU),

5 *Concerned by* the failures of existing transparency and accountability mechanisms regarding Member States
6 research into biotechnology, biotechnology facilities, and bioweapons production capabilities,

7 *Having considered* the dual use of biological research for biological weapons and broader research institutions,

8 *Noting with regret* the complaints of inadequate funding and staffing for the ISU and its negative effects on
9 its mission of bioweapons disarmament,

10 *Guided by* precedents set within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and
11 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

12 1. *Recommends* the ISU to establish an independent advisory panel of experts to mirror its counterpart
13 within the OPCW:

14 (a) This panel should;

15 (i) Research the theoretical bioweaponry capabilities of emerging technologies;

16 (ii) Recommend sites reasonably identified by the committee as potential biological weapons pro-
17 duction facilities for investigation;

18 (iii) Regularly evaluate and reevaluate the current sources of bioweaponry threats;

19 (iv) Research countermeasures and cleanup protocols to more effectively deter and recover from
20 bioweapon attacks against innocents;

21 (v) Recommend guidelines for the safe and ethical development of civilian biotechnologies;

22 (b) This panel should consist of a diverse, multinational selection of biotechnology scientists, expe-
23 rienced diplomats and policymakers, and responsible business leaders;

24 (i) Experts should be selected using the same credentials and qualification processes as the Chemical
25 Weapons Convention (CWC);

26 (ii) Composed of United Nations approved academics, and scientists, who specialize in bioethics and
27 regional experts in their respective fields;

28 2. *Recommends* the ISU to establish a panel coinciding within the ISU regarding the ethical concerns of
29 biological research:

30 (a) Form cross-regional applicable definitions of ethical terms necessary to form guidelines;

31 (i) Establish the ethical guidelines regarding safe research;

32 (ii) Authorized to encourage the funding for those in compliance with expanded access to monetary
33 incentives toward their research;

(iii) Offer recommendations for those who did not meet the ethical guidelines to work with the panel to get their research to the standards and therefore receive eligibility for funding;

3. *Recommends* the establishment of bilateral and multilateral treaties amongst Member States that promote the exchange of biotechnology research and infrastructure contingent on compliance with the BWC:

(a) Implores that signatories enter into multilateral agreements with one another to add another level of compliance within the BWC framework;

(b) The content of these multilateral agreements will be negotiated between the participating Member States of each region with a representative of the independent advisory panel present;

(i) All measures of these multilateral agreements should be formulated within the scope of the United Nations Charter as well as the Biological Weapons Convention;

(c) Urges open access to relevant information on private research of biotechnologies that could be weaponized or pose a risk in matters of international biosecurity;

4. *Presses* for regular inspections of BWC Member States high-risk biotechnology facilities by BWC and ISU inspectors to independently determine BWC compliance and potential security threats to the facilities themselves, in a manner consistent with BWC policies and with protocols used by the IAEA;

5. *Recommends* a common framework and standard procedures to mitigate the effects of the intentional or unintentional use of biological weapons across civilian and non-civilian populations;

6. *Affirms* the further integration of the ISU in national, regional, and cross-regional partnerships for biological defense.

Passed, Yes: 54 / No: 14 / Abstain: 15